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Metromedia v. San Diego III: Content
Regulation, Commercial Speech, and
the California Supreme Court's
Recent Billboard Decision
By

STEVEN SAXTON*

I
Introduction
San Diego's billboard control ordinance 1 died a prolonged
and noisy death, pronounced at last in Metromedia v. City of
San Diego2 (MetromediaIII). That such an apparently simple
proposition as getting rid of huge, ugly signs in a community
where tourism transforms aesthetic beauty into hard cash
should result in complex and controversial first amendment issues surely escapes immediate understanding. The constitutional difficulties underlying the Metromedia cases extend well
beyond billboard control, however, and have roots deep in historical first amendment adjudication.
The first challenge by billboard owners to the San Diego ordinance was rejected by the California Supreme Court in 1980
in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego3 (MetromediaI). The
California court upheld the city's broad ban on billboards
against a first amendment challenge, finding the enactment to
be a valid time, place and manner regulation of commercial
speech.4 The United States Supreme Court reversed the state
court in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San DiegoI (Metromedia
II). The Court found that while the ordinance permissibly restricted commercial speech under applicable tests for state
regulation of commercial speech, 6 the prohibition on billboards
*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Member, Third Year Class. A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1976.
SAN DIEGO, CAL., ORDINANCE 10795 (New Series) (March 14, 1972).
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 32 Cal. 3d 180 (1982).
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848 (1980).
Id.
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
The test is set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
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extended impermissibly into noncommercial speech in violation of the first amendment.7 The Court remanded the case to
the state court for a determination of whether a limiting construction-restricting the reach of the ordinance to commercial
speech-could be effected in order to preserve its
constitutionality. 8
In Metromedia III the California Supreme Court examined
the possibility of applying a limiting construction to the ordinance. The court found this task unmanageable, and in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision found the ordinance
unconstitutional on its face.9
Metromedia III represents the first attempt to interpret highly important but complex first amendment issues in Metromedia II. Notwithstanding the complexity of reasoning or
the confusion presented by the Metromedia II decision, 10 the
California court was faced with a relatively limited and uncomplicated chore-bringing the billboard ordinance into line with
a fairly narrow aspect of the Supreme Court's virtual pronouncement that noncommercial speech should under no circumstances be provided less protection than that afforded to
commercial speech." The state court declined to do so.
This note examines the reasons for the California court's decision in Metromedia III. First, the note summarizes the opinions of the MetromediaII plurality and concurrence. It focuses
on the Court's disagreements over content neutrality and commercial speech protection, issues crucial to understanding the
Metromedia III decision. The note provides background on
these issues, and examines the Supreme Court's use of the
term "content," its approach to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, and its use of that distinction in shaping first amendment protection of expression.
Finally, the note analyzes the relation between Metromedia II
and Metromedia III.
Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

The case is discussed infra at text accompanying

notes 74-81 and 106-13.
7. Metromedia II, 453 U.S. at 513.
8. Id. at 521-22 n.26.
9. Metromedia III, 32 Cal. 3d at 191.
10. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist's dissent described the Court's decision as a "virtual

Tower of Babel, from which no definitive principles can be clearly drawn." Metromedia
II, 453 U.S. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

11. Id. at 513.
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II

Metromedia II
A. Summary of the Rulings: Plurality and Concurring Opinions' 2
In Metromedia II, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed by a 4-2-3
decision a California Supreme Court decision which had upheld a San Diego ordinance prohibiting all offsite "outdoor advertising display signs."' 3 The ordinance defined an "offsite
sign" as any sign that did not "identify a use, facility or service
located on the premises or a product which is produced, sold or
manufactured on the premises."' 4 The ordinance included several specific exceptions to the prohibition, largely designed to
allow various functional and public service communications."
Because the ban was so comprehensive and its exceptions so
numerous, the ordinance virtually assured analytical difficulties. Disagreement arose immediately among the justices over
what the ordinance did and did not prohibit and therefore what
analytical framework was appropriate to deal with it.' 6
Writing for a four-member plurality, Justice White found the
ordinance an unconstitutional content-based restriction on
protected speech because it discriminated against noncommercial speech in favor of commercial speech.' 7 In contrast to
the Metromedia I court, the plurality in Metromedia II found
12. The MetromediaII dissents are not specifically dealt with here as they did not
directly influence the Metromedia III decision and are therefore beyond the scope of
this note. It is noteworthy, however, that the dissenters framed the issue as that of a
total ban on billboards (Id. at 540, 560, 570), as did the concurrence. Further, Justice
Stevens saw the ordinance as content neutral (Id. at 553) as did the Chief Justice (Id.
at 564-65).
13. Ordinance 10795. See Metromedia 1, 26 Cal. 3d at 856-57 for a discussion of the
provisions of the ordinance.
14. Metromedia I, 26 Cal. 3d at 856.
15. The exceptions include:
Signs maintained in the discharge of a governmental function; bench advertising signs, commemorative plaques, religious symbols, holiday decorations and
similar such signs; signs located from within the shopping malls not visible
from any point on the boundary of the premises; signs designating premises
for sale, rent or lease; public service signs depicting time, temperature or
news; signs on vehicles conforming to city regulations; and temporary offpremises subdivision directional signs.
Metromedia 1, 26 Cal. 3d at 856 n.l.
16. See Stephan, The FirstAmendment and Content Discrimination,68 VA. L. REV.
203, 244-245 (1982). See also discussion infra, note 90.
17. Metromedia 11, 453 U.S. at 513-15. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgment while Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented
in part, and Justice Rehnquist and the Chief Justice filed separate dissenting opinions.
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that the ordinance distinguished between types of speech in
two respects. 8 First, the plurality found that the ordinance impermissibly discriminated against noncommercial speech in
that onsite signs, permitted by the ordinance, were restricted
to those carrying commercial messages. 9 This finding appears
to be based on the assumption that only commercial establishments would erect onsite billboards.2" Second, the plurality
found that the ordinance impermissibly discriminated among
categories of noncommercial speech in that it specifically allowed certain noncommercial messages but prohibited all
others.21 As a result, the ordinance was held facially invalid as
18. The California court in Metromedia I determined the ordinance was contentneutral. The term "content-neutral" may mean any number of things depending on
context. See infra notes 35-51 and accompanying text. In this instance, the court explained content neutrality only briefly by way of distinguishing the ordinance in question from laws stricken by courts elsewhere which had "aimed at the suppression of a
particular message based on the content of that message." 26 Cal. 3d at 868. As
pointed out by the court, "content" in those instances consisted, for example, of advertisement of drug prices or advertising of how to obtain an abortion. Id.
It is noteworthy that the California Supreme Court perceived no problem of content
discrimination with the ordinance. "Ordinance No. 10795 ... was not enacted to prevent an advertiser from communicating his message to the public, but only to bar him
from using a particularly unsightly and intrusive mode of communication." Id. Further, the court found this "mode" particularly susceptible to regulation since "[u Inlike
leaflets, newspapers and the like, a billboard is a large, immobile, and permanent
structure which like other structures is subject to zoning regulation." Id. at 870.
19. Metromedia11, 453 U.S. at 513. Notably, the court in Metromedia I perceived no
such distinction in the ordinance between commercial and noncommercial speech. In
fact, the court construed the ordinance as directed at commercial speech alone and
adopted a definition of "outdoor advertising display" (26 Cal. 3d at 856 n.2) which confined the reach of the restriction to "permanent structures used predominantly for
commercial advertising." Id. (emphasis added).
Whatever effect on noncommercial speech the ordinance might conceivably have,
the commercial nature of the billboard medium apparently assured the California
court that such an effect would not be constitutionally significant, since "[the relatively few noncommercial advertisers who would be restricted by the San Diego ordinance also possesses [sic] a great variety of alternative means of communication
.... " Id. at 869.

As to any possible constitutional problems raised by the commercial/noncommercial distinction, the court noted:
The possibility that the ordinance may impede an occasional [noncommercial] advertiser from communicating his message to the public ... is not sufficient to invalidate the ordinance on itsface .... [SI uch an advertiser retains
the ability to assert that, owing to the absence of reasonable alternative means
of communication, the ordinance cannot constitutionally be applied to prevent
him from using a billboard to proclaim his message.
Id. at 869 n.14 (emphasis in original).
20. For discussion of this reading of the ordinance, see infra note 90.
21. See supra note 15.

No. 31

COMMERCIAL SPEECH REGULATION

an infringement of noncommercial speech.22
The plurality held that while a city may afford less protection
to commercial speech than to noncommercial speech2 3 because
the former is of less first amendment value, 24 it must assure
protection to noncommercial speech to an equal or greater degree than that afforded commercial speech.25 On the basis of
this principle of first amendment protection, the plurality invited the California court to sever the objectionable portions of
the ordinance in order to restrict its application to commercial
speech alone.2 6 Restricting the reach of the ordinance in this
fashion would, in the plurality's view, salvage the constitutionality of the ordinance 27 by assuring equal or greater protection
of noncommercial speech in relation to commercial speech.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in
the judgment, but took issue with the plurality's reasoning,2 8
principally with its conclusion that a total ban on commercial
billboards, while permitting noncommercial billboards, would
be constitutional.2 9 Justice Brennan viewed such a restriction
as a threat to the protection of speech because of the dangers
inherent in according city officials discretion to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech.3 0 Such discretion, according to the concurrence, would invite the
possibilities of unconstitutional prior restraints on protected
speech as well as selective enforcement by city officials of restrictions on first amendment expression.3
The second major ground of disagreement concerned the degree of protection afforded commercial speech. Justice Brennan argued that prior commercial speech cases called for
significantly greater protection of commercial speech than allowed by the plurality 2 and on a basis considerably different
22. Metromedia II, 453 U.S. at 513-515.
23. Id. at 514. The plurality noted, "[a]lthough the city may distinguish between
the relative value of different categories of commercial speech, the city does not have
the same range of choice in the area of noncommercial speech. . . ." Id.
24. Id. at 506.
25. Id. at 513.
26. Id. at 521-22 n.26.
27. Id.
28. The concurrence went to some length to distinguish its reading of the ordinance. See infra note 90.
29. Metromedia II, 453 U.S. at 536 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 534-35 n.12. See also infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
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from the plurality's conclusion that commercial speech simply
has less first amendment value than other forms of speech. 3
A treatment of these divergent views requires a discussion of
the relevant background of content neutrality and content discrimination principles, along with the commercial speech doctrine.
These principles underlie the concerns of the
Metromedia II opinions, with the result that the conflicts
among the opinions highlight points of confusion in the doctrines of content neutrality and commercial speech. Further, it
is from the perspective provided by this background that the
Metromedia III decision is best understood.3 4
B.

35
What is "Content?"

For analytical purposes, expression may be said to consist of
several elements-message, topic, viewpoint, subject matter
and impact on an audience, for example. The Supreme Court
has in various instances used each of these elements and combinations of them to identify the "content" which is significant
for first amendment purposes. The result has been confusion
in first amendment adjudication, for the term "content" has
been employed inconsistently.
The importance of speech "content" has arisen under two
general analyses, however, and distinguishing these analyses
'36
sheds some light on the meaning of the term "content.
Under the first analysis, the Court has examined the content of
expression to determine whether it is protected at all, with the
result that obscenity, for example, has been excluded from first
amendment protection. The second type of analysis concerns
types of speech which do not fall into the excluded category.
Under this analysis, the Court has examined instances where
restrictions on protected speech have been challenged as violative of the first amendment.
33. Id.
34. See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
35. See generally, Stephan, supra note 16. The sketch of content and content
discrimination set forth here, particularly the import of the pertinent cases, is derived

principally from Professor Stephan's comprehensive and provocative essay.
36. The discussion of the separate analyses under which "content" serves as a focal point assumes the separability of the questions "Does the speech in question have
value?" and "On what basis is the speech to be protected in relation to other types of
speech?" The alternative view is that the two questions both represent inquiries into

the value of speech generally and are separable only as a matter of degree. See Stephan, supra note 16, where the latter view is taken.
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1. The "Excluded Speech" Analysis
Under the first analysis, the Court has focused on speech
content to determine whether it possesses value for first
amendment purposes. This inquiry into speech value gave rise
to the "two-level theory ' 37 of protection, whereby expression
which is libelous, obscene or which contains fighting words is
unprotected.'
Excluded expression has little or no social
value, as it is unconnected with the "exposition of ideas."3 9 Until recently, commercial speech' ° was held to be similarly without value and consigned to this same constitutional purgatory,
beyond the protection of the first amendment.4 ' Under this
analysis, then, expression is protected or excluded on the basis
of its content. Content, in turn, is identified in terms of speech
value.Y
2.

The "ProtectedSpeech" Analysis

Under the second general analysis, forms of concededly protected speech have been examined to determine the degree
and type of protection they should be given, and under what
circumstances. The crucial point of distinction between the
"excluded speech" and "protected speech" analyses stems
from the fact that speech value is not appropriate as a tool for
analyzing "protected speech" issues.4 3 Protected speech has
value by definition. In theory, sexually explicit films are as valuable as political advocacy under the first amendment, and the
government ought to remain neutral as to each of these forms
37. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Commercial speech was first afforded some degree of protection in Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The protection was significantly amplified soon after in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).

41. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (explicitly denied first amendment
protection to commercial speech).
42. In this sense, "content" appears to be not so much the substance of the expression, but rather some aspect of that substance which can be characterized as having a
harmful effect on the hearer. No analytical reason would appear to prevent the Court
from identifying "content" in terms of the effect of expression on its audience, but the
question "is the speech of value substantively?" differs from the question "is the
speech harmful?" Some of the confusion in the content area however, may be explained by the Court's asking a slightly different question from what it purports to ask.
43. But see supra note 36.

588

Comm/ENrT L. J.

[Vol. 5

of content." Unfortunately, the Court has not consistently enforced such a rule of neutrality. The explanation for this inconsistency lies in the Court's definitions of "content" within the
"protected speech" context.
3.

"Viewpoint Content" and "Subject Matter Content"

Under the "protected speech" analysis, the Court has vacillated between two conceptions of constitutionally significant
content.4 5 The first, "viewpoint content,"' identifies content as
the point of view of the speaker. This definition requires that
the government remain neutral as to the viewpoint which an
instance of expression reflects. Virtually any instance of political expression will contain this narrow element of significant
content. The government may not ordinarily restrict the partisan message "Vote for Brown." It may never restrict the latter
viewpoint while simultaneously placing no restriction on the
message "Vote for Green."4 7
The second, much broader, conception of constitutionally
significant content is "subject matter content." 48 Under this
view the government must remain neutral as to virtually all aspects of expression, not just point of view.4 9 This broad, subject matter notion of content gave rise to a sweeping
44. But see Stephan, supra note 16, at 210-13.
Stephan's argument in favor of discriminating among instances of concededly protected speech rests in part on the premise that such discrimination is not different in
kind from that between protected and unprotected speech-i.e., despite its pronouncements as to the rule(s) against discrimination, the Court already does so. Id.
45. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
46. This classification derives in part from Stephan's formulation of content neutrality rules. See Stephan, supra note 16, at 218.
47. Historically, the Court has addressed content discrimination issues in terms of
viewpoint content. The determinations which follow from this treatment of content
give rise to relatively clear and limited principles of neutrality, or nondiscrimination,
as to the content of speech. The government obviously may not, for example, suppress
speech by way of punitive taxation because the speech protests legislation. See Stephan, supra note 16, at 215 (citing Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233 (1936)).
Stephan identifies four distinct stages of development in the Court's definitions of
"content discrimination" from Grosjean to Metromedia II. Id. at 215-18 and cases cited
therein.
48. See generally Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 81 (1978).
49. Stephan, supra note 16, at 204. His characterization of the difficulties an absolute content-neutrality rule present is instructive:
Taken literally, this [Mosley) proposition means that governmental bodies
must disregard all differences in the content of expression and therefore must
treat all speech as indistinguishable .... Carried to its logical extreme, this
rule ... would require... that federal labor law apply uniform rules to all
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pronouncement of this rule of neutrality in Police Department
v. Mosley: 0 "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because
1
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."'
The meaning of "content discrimination"-discrimination
against one instance of speech in favor of another--can be entirely different depending on which definition of content is employed.
To restrict political advertising while allowing
commercial advertising has been found permissible, for example, but only because "viewpoints" do not conflict in that instance, and thus no question of content discrimination is
present. 2
On the other hand, the Court has found that allowing labor
picketing where racial discrimination picketing was prohibited
violates the rule of neutrality provided in Mosley. 3 The same
result has occurred where sexually explicit films-but not
other forms of cinematic subject matter-were restricted. 4 No
such results would have been possible had the "subject matter" definition of content not been employed. The discrimination resulted from the government's preferring one type of
subject matter over another.
One part of the content discrimination/content neutrality
confusion, therefore, stems from the Court's use of different
content definitions in different instances without explaining
why one definition was appropriate rather than the other. 5
The other part of the confusion in this area concerns the use of
picketing, whether labor-related or not, to ensure that no special burdens or
advantages would attach to the content-based category of labor speech.
Id. (footnote omitted).
50. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
51. Id. at 95.
52. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). See also Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (rejecting the content discrimination issue for lack of discrimination among political viewpoints); United States Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) and Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973) (each upholding restrictions applied to all points of view).
53. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (citing Mosley as squarely on point in
striking down an ordinance prohibiting picketing of a residence (here the Mayor of
Chicago's) by anyone other than a resident or one involved in a labor dispute at the
residence); First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (citing Mosley in striking
down restrictions on political speech of corporations); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (citing Mosley in striking down restrictions on
the political speech of public utilities).
54. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
55. See generally Stephan, supra note 16; Stone, supra note 48; Farber, Content
Regulation and the FirstAmendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980).
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assessing the value of speech in shaping first amendment protection. As noted above, the practice of assessing speech value
should theoretically be restricted to the "excluded speech"
analysis. As protected speech has value by definition, no clear
reason exists for distinguishing the relative value of one type
of protected speech from that of another-other than the reason of one's subjective preference. 56 The weighing and balancing of interests required under the first amendment requires
considerable subjectivity. Extending the assessment of speech
value into the "protected speech" analysis only exacerbates
57
the problem.
Analytically, limiting the assessment of value to the "excluded speech" analysis can be consistent with either viewpoint or subject matter definitions of content. With respect to
viewpoint content, leaving value out of the analysis is consistent with the idea that no viewpoint is more valuable than another, and that neutrality should be enforced accordingly. As
to subject matter content, the very breadth of the definition
compels neutrality as to all forms of protected speech without
regard to their relative value. Not only has the Court confused
its definitions of speech content, it has extended the use of
speech value to its analysis of "protected speech" issues; it has
confounded the indispensable form of "content discrimination" used in the "excluded speech" analysis with the impermissible form of "content discrimination" which is the purpose
of the "protected speech" analysis to prevent. Metromedia II
is a prime example of the confusion 8 which inevitably results
from such an admixture of incompatibles.
4. The Metromedia II Treatment of Content
The Supreme Court's classifications of content in Metromedia II differed widely among the various opinions, giving
rise to inconsistent ideas of what constitutes discrimination
56. But see supra notes 36 & 44. It should be noted that the separation of the analyses is by no means settled by Mosley. Justice Rehnquist, for example, discusses the
justifications for content regulation under the "protected speech analysis" described
here by reference to the content discrimination permitted under the "excluded speech
analysis." Central Hudson Gas & Electic Company v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.
30, 592-93 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57. For discussion of the problems involved in the 'overlap' between the two analyses, see infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
58. But see Farber, supra note 55. Under Professor Farber's theory, the apparent
confusion in the content regulation cases actually represents "a pattern of principled
decision-making" by the Burger Court. Id. at 729.
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against content.5 9 The plurality's position becomes clearer in
light of the relatively straightforward approach of the dissents.
The Metromedia II dissenters argued for narrow, viewpoint
neutrality.60 Justice Stevens, for example, found that the San
Diego ordinance presented no content discrimination issue at
all. As the ordinance did not target viewpoint content, it gave
rise to no issue of disadvantaging one form of expression in
favor of another on the basis of content. 61 The dissenters
therefore based their discussions on assumptions about content wholly different6 2 from those of the plurality and concurring opinions.
Both Justice White and Justice Brennan classified content
broadly,6 3 in terms of subject matter, rather than narrowly, in
terms of viewpoint. Justice White characterized significant
content by relying on language from Mosley, using such general terms as "communicative interests"' and "subjects for
public debate."6 Further, Justice White explicitly rejected the
viewpoint neutrality concept, saying: "'The first amendment's
hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of
public discussion of an entire topic.' "66
The plurality's position regarding content classifications and
content neutrality might be characterized as a middle ground
between the narrow viewpoint position and the all-inclusive
Mosley subject matter position. The plurality acknowledged a
broad range of constitutionally significant content, reaffirming
the Mosley rule of neutrality as to subject matter. It stopped
short of interpreting that rule too broadly however, by acknowledging that discrimination based on content is permissible where the target of regulation, here commercial speech, is
59. See Stephan, supra note 16, at 244-50.
60. Id. at 245 (citing Metromedia II, 453 U.S. 490 at 553-555) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 561-64 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at 569-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Metromedia 11, 453 U.S. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. See supra note 12.
63. The idea that distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech gives
rise to discrimination problems at all requires a "subject matter" classification of significant content. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text, and supra notes 17-22
and accompanying text.
64. Metromedia 11, 453 U.S. at 514.
65. Id. at 515.
66. Id. at 519 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530 at 537 (1980)).
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less constitutionally significant than other forms of speech.6 7
Justice Brennan disagreed with the plurality in this latter respect. Although the Court has apparently settled on the principle that commercial speech deserves less protection than other
forms of protected speech,6 8 Justice Brennan took issue with
the scope of and justification for discrimination permitted by
the plurality, both between commercial speech and noncommercial speech and among instances of purely commercial
speech. 69 This dispute forms the basis of the concurrence's argument that a broad ban on commercial billboards alone, as
recommended by the plurality, raises constitutional
problems.°
7
C. Metromedia II and Protection of Commercial Speech '

1. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality's conclusion that a ban on commercial billboards would be constitutional, 72 along with its suggestions
concerning the city's options regarding regulations solely affecting commercial speech, 3 followed from a two part analysis
of the billboard ordinance. The first part focused on the validity of the restriction of commercial speech, the second on the
ordinance's effect on noncommercial speech. This separate
treatment followed from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Comm 'n71 which provides for a four-part test
to measure the validity of a restriction of commercial speech.7 5
First, to fall within the protection of the first amendment the
expression must concern lawful activity and not be mislead67. See discussion of discrimination, infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
68. The "intermediate level of scrutiny" appropriate to commercial speech and its
lower position in the first amendment hierarchy of values was most clearly set forth in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 30 (1980),
discussed infra notes 106-113 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
71. The discussion here is necessarily limited to particular aspects of the
Metromedia II commercial speech approach which affected the Metromedia III
decision. For fuller treatment see Note, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 10 ECOL.
L.Q. 125 (1982); Note, The Media Win the Billboard Battle, but Metro Wins the War:
Metromedia,Inc. v. City of San Diego, 15 U.C.D. L REV. 493 (1981).
72. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
74. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
75. Id. at 566.
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ing.7 6 Second, the restriction must seek to advance a substantial governmental interest.77 Third, the regulation must
directly advance the governmental interest.7 8 Fourth, the regulation must not be more extensive
than necessary to further
79
the governmental interest.
The plurality found that the ordinance's restrictions of commercial speech met the requirements of CentralHudson ,80 the
key perhaps being its finding that traffic safety and aesthetics
constituted substantial governmental interests.8 1
In analyzing the protection appropriate to each form of
speech, the plurality suggested regulative options open to the
city which admit of considerable discrimination against commercial speech. Without invoking the "substantial governmental interest" limitation of Central Hudson, the plurality implied
the permissibility of virtually unlimited discrimination among
various kinds of commercial messages. It observed, for example, that "offsite commercial billboards may be prohibited
while onsite commercial billboards are permitted" based
merely on the city's "reasonable" determination of it's own interests. 8

2

Moreover, the plurality appears to have explicitly in-

vited such discrimination within the area of commercial
speech: "[T]he city may distinguish between the relative
value of different categories of commercial speech .... 83 Ad-

ditionally the plurality noted that the city's determination that
some commercial speech outweighs certain of the city's own
interests does not require that the city "give similar weight to
all other commercial advertising."84 It is difficult to distinguish
the permissible scope of state regulation suggested by these
remarks from that permitted in the area of economic regulations,85 where restrictions on private activities may be sustained by a state interest having a rational basis. For this
reason, Metromedia II leaves open considerable doubt as to
the first amendment status of commercial speech, despite the
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Metromedia II, 453 U.S. at 507.
81. Id. at 507-11; Justice Brennan took sharp issue with these conclusions. See id.
at 528 n.7 & 531 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 512.
83. Id. at 514.
84. Id. at 512.
85. See Stephan, supra note 16, at n.185 and accompanying text.
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relatively clear Central Hudson test upon which the plurality
relied.
In assessing the effect of the ordinance on noncommercial
speech, the plurality found that the restrictions ran afoul of the
Court's earlier decisions which had "consistently accorded
noncommercial speech a greater degree of protection than
commercial speech."8 6 In accordance with this principle, the
plurality observed:
San Diego effectively inverts this judgment, by affording a
greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech. There is a broad exception for onsite commercial advertisements, but there is no similar exception for
noncommercial speech. The use of onsite billboards to carry
commercial messages related to the commercial use of the
premises is freely permitted, but the use of otherwise identical
billboards to carry noncommercial messages is generally prohibited .... Insofar as the city tolerates billboards at all, it

cannot choose to limit their content to commercial messages;
the city may not conclude that the communication of commercial information concerning goods and services connected with
value than the communication of
a particular site is of greater
87
messages.
noncommercial
In short, a restriction of speech may not constitutionally
subordinate noncommercial speech to commercial speech;
noncommercial speech merits equal or greaterprotection.8 8 In
view of this requirement, the plurality ruled that the San Diego
ordinance could be made to conform to the constitution by limiting its reach to commercial speech.8 9
2.

The ConcurringOpinion

Apart from its objection to the plurality's factual view of the
ordinance,9" Justice Brennan's concurring opinion questioned
86. Metromedia 1I, 453 U.S. at 513.
87. Id.
88. See Stephan, supra note 16, at 247. In Professor Stephan's terminology this
principle is called the "equal-or-greater" rule of content neutrality. Id.
89. Metromedia II, 453 U.S. at 521-22 n.26.
90. Justice Brennan argued that the plurality misread the ordinance's onsite allowance of signs when it interpreted those signs as restricted to those carrying exclusively commercial messages. Id. at 535 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
Brennan's reading would therefore eliminate a crucial distinction which supported the
plurality's conclusion that the ordinance disadvantaged noncommercial speech. See
supra note 82 and accompanying text; supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. As to
the discriminatory nature of the ofisite exceptions, Justice Stevens makes the interesting observation that of the twelve offsite exceptions provided by the ordinance, (see
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the plurality's interpretation of just how much protection is afforded commercial speech alone.9 ' Where the plurality apparently read Central Hudson as allowing virtually unlimited
discrimination among instances of purely commercial speech,
the concurrence argued that Central Hudson requires more
than merely "a rational basis for preferring one kind of commercial speech over another."9 2
Justice Brennan's principal objection to the plurality's reasoning rests on the difficulty of making the general distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech. Justice
Brennan saw this as a special concern where city officials are
charged with making the distinction:
It is one thing for a court to classify in specific cases whether
commercial or noncommercial speech is involved, but quite another-and for me dispositively so--for a city to do so regularly
for the purpose of deciding what messages may be communicated by way of billboards. Cities are equipped to make traditional police power decisions, not decisions based on the
content of speech. I would be unhappy to see city officials dealing with the following series of billboards and deciding which
ones to permit: the first billboard contains the message "Visit
Joe's Ice Cream Shoppe"; the second, "Joe's Ice Cream Shoppe
uses only the highest quality dairy products"; the third, "Because Joe thinks that dairy products are good for you, please
shop at Joe's Shoppe"; and the fourth, "Joe says to support
dairy price
supports: they mean lower prices for you at his
' 93
Shoppe.
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Central Hudson underscored the problem of distinguishing commercial and nonsupra note 15) five arguably were not covered by the ordinance at all in light of the
California Supreme Court's limiting construction which defined an outdoor advertising
display in basically structural terms (see supra note 19). Of the remaining exceptions
only four were in any sense based on subject matter. 453 U.S. at 554 n.25 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Between them, Brennan and Stevens raised substantial doubts about the
plurality's factual analysis and in turn about the extent of discrimination against noncommercial speech asserted by the plurality.
91. Id. at 534-35 n.12.
92. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
93. Metromedia II, 453 U.S. at 538 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (citations
omitted). Justice Brennan had expressed this same concern in Lehman observing,
"[tj he line between ideological and nonideological speech is impossible to draw with
accuracy." 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). He further noted in Metromedia II that a chief concern of the Virginia Pharmacy decision arose from the
anticipated difficulty of drawing such a line (453 U.S. at 539 (Brennan, J., concurring)),
a problem Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in his dissent to that decision. 425 U.S. at
781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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commercial speech rather dramatically when, after observing
that "it is important that the commercial speech concept not be
defined too broadly lest speech deserving of greater constitutional protection be inadvertently suppressed,"9 4 he concluded
that the restriction in question impermissibly reached the
speaker's viewpoint. For that reason Justice Stevens concurred, but only because he did not consider Central Hudson
to be a 'commercial speech' case.95
On the other hand, the clear implication of Justice White's
plurality opinion is that drawing a line between commercial
and noncommercial speech presents no great difficulty, as the
holding of that opinion is not only based on a bifurcated analysis of the two but in effect would require the San Diego City
Council to distinguish them.
Considerable scholarly support exists for the proposition
that the distinction represents no insurmountable problem. 6
Professor Stephan observes that "There is no readily apparent
reason why courts are better qualified than other governmental bodies to distinguish commercial from noncommercial
speech, especially given the relatively clear functional standard on which the Court has based the distinction."9 7
94. 447 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
95. Id. at 583. For the view that the difficulty of this line drawing engendered major dissatisfaction with the original Chrestensen commercial speech doctrine, see Aronovsky, Metromedia,Inc. v. City of San Diego, Aesthetics, the FirstAmendment, and the
Realities of Billboard Control, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 295, 318-20 (1981).
96. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 48; Farber, supra note 55; Schauer, Categoriesand
the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L REV. 265 (1981) (expressing
some general reservations as to indulging in subcategorization of expression). But see
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CH. L. REv. 20
(1975); Kushner, Freedom to Hear: The First Amendment, Commercial Speech and Access to Information, 28 WAYNE L REv. 137 (1981).
Whatever the merits of either position, the fact remains that the issue of drawing the
line between commercial and noncommercial speech is far from settled, and certainly
no general definition of commercial speech has been agreed upon. The issue has that
uncertainty in common with virtually every other facet of the Metromedia II decision,
and it was one which would play prominently in the decision in Metromedia III. See
infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
97. Stephan, supra note 16, at 250 (footnote omitted). The "functional standard" to
which Stephan refers comes from Central Hudson (discussed infra notes 105-13 and
accompanying text): "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience." Id. at n.200 (quoting 447 U.S. at 561). Professor Stephan
does not relate, however, the strong criticism leveled at this sort of definition in, e.g.,
Justice Stevens' concurrence (447 U.S. at 579-83) which flatly labels this definition as
"unquestionably too broad." Id. at 580.
Further, Stephen's satisfaction with this functional standard underplays Brennan's
concern with problems of prior restraint and selective enforcement: surely some differ-
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In large measure because of the perceived difficulty in drawing the distinction, and because of potential difficulties in allowing city officials to do so, Justice Brennan objected to the
conclusion that a total ban on commercial billboards, while
be
noncommercial
billboards,
would
permitting
constitutional: 98
For me, such an ordinance raises First Amendment problems
at least as serious as those raised by a total ban, for it gives city
officials the right-before approving a billboard-to determine
whether the proposed message is "commercial" or "noncommercial." Of course the plurality is correct when it observes
that "our cases have consistently distinguished between the
constitutional protection afforded commercial as opposed to
noncommercial speech," but it errs in assuming that a governmental unit may be put in the position in the first instance of
deciding whether the proposed speech is commercial or noncommercial. In individual cases, this distinction is anything
but clear. Because making such determinations would entail a
substantial exercise of discretion by a city's official, it presents
a real danger of curtailing noncommercial speech in the guise
of regulating commercial speech.9 9
This language suggests a view of content regulation far more
protective of commercial speech in relation to noncommercial
speech than what the plurality deemed appropriate, even
ence in purpose if not in qualification sets courts apart from "other governmental

units." See discussion infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
98. Metromedia 11, 453 U.S. at 536 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
99. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Brennan analogized such a situation to that in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), wherein the Court struck
down a statute prohibiting solicitation by religious groups unless a state official approved the cause as a religious one. The analogy extends to an entire line of cases
which invalidated various statutes on the ground that they permitted too much official
discretion in matters implicating constitutional protections (see cases cited at 453 U.S.
537-38). The result, according to this line of cases, is the danger of both prior restraint
on protected expression and selective enforcement by local officials. As in Brennan's
view the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech is difficult to
make-and has been recognized as such by the Court-Brennan asserted that the plurality's analysis would give rise to exactly those dangers.
Justice White answers this objection, in a sense, in addressing a point of dissent
made by Chief Justice Burger regarding the judicial role in "reviewing the relative
values the city has assigned to various communicative interests." 453 U.S. at 520. Justice White explains, "[The Chief Justice] seems to argue that although the Constitution affords a greater degree of protection to noncommercial than to commercial
speech, a legislature need not make the same choices. . . .This position makes little
sense even abstractly, and it surely is not consistent with our cases .... Id. at 520-21

(citation omitted).
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though Brennan's asserted justification is the "danger of curtailing noncommercial speech."
On its face, Justice Brennan's argument appears to require
equal protection of each category'°°-at least where protection
is extended by way of legislation rather than judicial determination. Such an equal protection rule seems problematic even
assuming it may be justified by the potential threat inherent in
allowing city officials the discretion to make quasi-constitutional determinations with regard to distinguishing forms of
speech. The broad rule of content neutrality, or nondiscrimination, suggested by Brennan appears to fly in the face of the
Central Hudson principle that commercial speech is a
subordinate category for first amendment purposes.
The conflict between Justice White's conclusions as to permissible content discrimination and Justice Brennan's conclusions as to equal protection creates much of the confusion in
Metromedia II. This conflict is better understood, however, by
reference to the development of commercial speech doctrine
generally, especially as set forth in the Central Hudson opinions. 10 ' In the commercial speech setting the Court's inconsistent approaches to content neutrality and discrimination are
readily apparent. The crux of this problem is the Court's attempt to resolve speech protection issues by assigning degrees
of value to forms of concededly protected speech. Under this,
the "protected speech" analysis, the assessment of value is
irrelevant.
3. The Hierarchy of Values in the Commercial Speech
Doctrine: The Court's Misuse of the "Excluded
Speech" Analysis
The commercial speech doctrine has emerged from the
Court's struggle to identify an appropriate justification for requiring neutrality as to commercial speech content. It has
been suggested from the inception'012 of commercial speech
protection that a different standard of protection from that em100. See Stephan, supra note 16, at 249-50. In Professor Stephan's terminology,
Brennan's principle of protection is "protected-speech neutrality." Id.
101. Extensive treatment of Central Hudson and commercial speech doctrine lies
beyond the scope of this note. For more thorough treatment see Note, Electric and Gas
UtilityAdvertising: The FirstAmendment Legacy of CentralHudson, 60 WASH. U. L.Q.
459 (1982); Recent Development, CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 11 ENVTL. L 767 (1981).
102. See supra note 40.
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ployed for other forms of protected speech might be
appropriate.
Justice Blackmun observed in the Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council10 3 majority
opinion that such attributes of commercial speech as its
"greater objectivity and hardiness" suggest "commonsense differences" between commercial and other varieties of speech
which justify their separate treatment. 10 4 Blackmun asserted
that these differences "may make it less necessary to tolerate
inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker. They
may also make it appropriate to require that a commercial
message appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.' ' 5
Central Hudson is a landmark case because it provides an
explicit standard of lesser protection. 10 6 The justification for
the lesser standard, however, is fundamentally different from
that suggested by Blackmun in Virginia Pharmacy. In the majority opinion, Justice Powell wrote: "This Court's decisions on
commercial expression have rested on the premise that such
speech although meriting some protection, is of less constitutional moment than other forms of speech."'' 0 This observation rested in large part on Justice Powell's previous remarks
in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n'0 8 where he observed:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial
and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply
by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guaran[W] e instead
tee with respect to the latter kind of speech ....
have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale
of First Amendment values ... J09
The conflict between the Central Hudson and Virginia Pharmacy justifications for a separate commercial speech standard
is demonstrated by Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Central
Hudson, in which he was joined by Justice Brennan in vehe103. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
104. Id. at 771-72 n.24.

105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
107. 447 U.S. at 563 n.5 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978))

(emphasis added).
108. Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
109. Id. at 456.
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1.

mently protesting the Central Hudson justification as a clear
departure from commercial speech precedent"°:
Our prior references to the "'commonsense differences'" between commercial speech and other speech "'suggest that a
different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the
flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is
unimpaired' ". We have not suggested that the "commonsense
differences" between commercial speech and other speech justify relaxed scrutiny of restraints that suppress truthful,
nondeceptive, noncoercive commercial speech. The differences articulated by the Court .. .justify a more permissive
approach to regulation of the manner of commercial speech for
the purpose of protecting consumers ... and these differences

explain why doctrines designed to prevent "chilling" of protected speech are inapplicable to commercial speech. No differences between commercial speech and other protected
speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public conduct
through manipulation of the availability
1
of information.
Overall, Justice Blackmun concluded that nondeceptive commercial speech merits the same strict standard of protection" 2
110. See 447 U.S. at 576 n.3 where Justice Blackmun observed:
[T]he Court today misconstrues the holdings of both Virginia Pharmacy
Board and Linmark Associates by implying that those decisions were based
on the fact that the restraints were not closely enough related to the governmental interests asserted. Although the Court noted the lack of substantial
relationship between the restraint and the governmental interest in each of
those cases the holding of each clearly rested on a much broader principle.
(Blackmun. J., concurring in judgment ) (citations omitted).
111. 447 U.S. at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun further argued:
Virginia Pharmacy Board did not analyze the State's interest to determine
whether they were "substantial." Obviously, preventing professional dereliction and low quality health care are "substantial," legitimate, and important
state goals. Nor did the opinion analyze the ban on speech to determine
whether it "directly advance[d]" . . . these goals. We also did not inquire
whether a "more limited regulation of... commercial expression,".

. .

would

adequately serve the State's interests. Rather, we held that the state "may not
[pursue its goals] by keeping the public in ignorance."
Until today, this principle has governed.
Id. at 576 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).
112. Justice Blackmun viewed this standard of review as having been explicitly applied in prior commercial speech cases:
The Court in Linmark resolved beyond all doubt that a strict standard of
review applies to suppression of commercial information, where the purpose
of the restraint is to influence behavior by depriving citizens of information.
The Court followed the strong statement above with an explicit adoption of
the standard advocated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California, "If there be time to expose through discussion the
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as that applied to other forms of speech." 3
Two lines of thought, then, emerge from the cases on the justification for the separate treatment of commercial speech.
Justice White's position in Metromedia II reflects the "hierarchy of values" approach whereby commercial speech, being
less valuable than other forms of protected speech,"14 may be
restricted on the basis of either a "substantial" or a "reasonable" governmental interest-it is not entirely clear which."'
On the other hand, Justice Brennan's position appears conso-6
nant with Justice Blackmun's Central Hudson argument"
that absent false, misleading or coercive elements, an instance
of commercial speech requires the same standard of protection
afforded to other forms of protected speech."' Except in limited situations, that is, equal protection is appropriate.
Theoretically, the issue is settled by Central Hudson: the
Constitution now requires a separate four-part test of restrictions of commercial speech because less value inheres in that
form of speech. Metromedia II, however, demonstrates how
problematic even so clear a holding as Central Hudson's can
be, for the different readings of commercial speech precedents
embodied in the plurality and concurring opinions contribute
in large measure to the almost incomprehensible nature of the
Metromedia 11 holdings.
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency
can justify repression."
Id. at 577 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).
113. Id. Notably, Justice Rehnquist appears to share this view of commercial
speech precedent, though he certainly disagreed with its justification. In his view, Central Hudson provided far more protection than was required: [T]he Court unlocked a
Pandora's box when it 'elevated' commercial speech to the level of traditional political
speech" in Virginia Pharmacy. Id. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
114. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
116. See Metromedia II, 453 U.S. at 534-35 n.12. Justice Brennan here argues that
the fundamental reason for allowing a different degree of protection for commercial
speech is to prevent false and misleading advertising, citing the "commonsense differences" language of Virginia Pharmacy (see supra notes 103-05 and accompanying
text). Brennan observes that no such reason is implicated by the San Diego ordinance. Id. (citing Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977)); See
also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (prohibition of use of trade names by optometrists upheld on grounds of potential to mislead consumers); Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (statute barring attorney advertising on grounds of false or
misleading potential stricken).
117. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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4. Implications of Metromedia II
By applying the hierarchy of values reasoning to commercial
speech, the plurality set forth one clear principle: noncommercial speech commands equal or greater protection in relation to
commercial speech. Applying this principle is potentially
troublesome, however. The assignment of value to an instance
of expression invites further subjectivity into first amendment
analysis. As a result, where a degree of value is employed as a
gauge of speech protection, standards for regulating expression appear vague. No clear limit to the scope of governmental
interference with expression is identifiable apart from the government's determination of its own interests." 8
By contrast, the Virginia Pharmacy analysis provided a far
more objective approach. False, misleading and coercive elements of commercial expression" 9 appear concrete and readily
discernible in comparison to the ephemeral values posited by
the opinions in Central Hudson and Metromedia II. The Virginia Pharmacy elements form the basis for a definite standard to be used in assessing state regulations.
Apart from the insubstantial standards it generates, the hierarchy of values concept as employed in Metromedia II reflects
analytical confusion which if carried further promises tangled
decisions ahead. As noted earlier, the "excluded speech" and
"protected speech" analyses ought to remain separate.2 0 The
concerns which permit "content discrimination" under the "excluded speech" analysis involve the clear potential for harm of
a magnitude which is not present in the "protected speech"
area. 12 This potential in libel and fighting words, for example,
provides a strong basis for distinguishing the objects of each
analysis and for confining the assessment of speech value to
the "excluded speech" analysis.
Arguably, of course, a judicial determination that libel is less
'valuable' than political advocacy is no less subjective than a
determination that sexually explicit films are less valuable
than travelogues, or that supermarket price lists are less valua118. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
121. A possible exception is obscenity, a classification of content raising analytical
difficulties so numerous as to suggest that it requires treatment entirely apart from
what may be appropriate in either the "excluded speech" or "protected speech"
analysis.
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ble than political campaign ads. But it is clear that the latter
require extremely fine line-drawing in order to distinguish
them. Moreover, the determination of value in the libel and
fighting words context is keyed to what most would consider
the destructive nature of that type of expression, and not
merely to the preferences of individuals.
A further difficulty with Metromedia 11 is the possibility of
its influence beyond the bounds of commercial speech. The
plurality opinion extends the hierarchy of values reasoning beyond its use in CentralHudson. Although the evolution of this
concept within the "protected speech" area appears to be limited presently to commercial speech, no logical limitation
seems to bar the hierarchy of values analysis from other areas
of protected speech. Indeed, such an analysis has appeared in
noncommercial speech cases, for example in the argument that
sexually explicit films rank lower on the hierarchy than other
artistic expression. 122 However, such an extension of the hierpresently appear to comarchy of values reasoning would12not
3
mand a majority of the justices.
That the question of the relative value of speech content has
spilled over from the "excluded speech" analysis to the "protected speech" analysis is manifest in Central Hudson and
commercial speech doctrine generally. That the result is confusion and disarray in first amendment adjudication is demonstrated by the mixed messages conveyed by Metromedia H.
For other courts and legislative bodies to implement the Metromedia II guidelines requires far more than to apply, for example, the plurality's principle of equal or greater protection of
122. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 at 70 (1976). See also New York
v. Ferber,-U.S.-, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3367 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Ferber the
Court applied a Chaplinsky approach in holding films depicting children engaged in
sexual activity to be beyond the reach of first amendment protection. The finding remains consistent with the "excluded speech" approach to the regulation of content
(see supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text) in the sense that a form of expression
determined to have little or no value was held to be categorically separate from speech
within the first amendment sphere. As in Young, however, Justice Stevens continues
to press for the general adoption of the hierarchy of values approach. Id. See also
F.C.C. v. Paciflica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
123. The hierarchy of values reasoning employed by the majority opinion in Young
(supra note 122 to uphold the zoning restrictions against 'blue movie' theatres was
supported by only four justices. Justice Powell, curiously enough, rejected the hierarchy of values approach in this context, (427 U.S. at 75 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment)) despite his central role in bringing the hierarchy of values to the fore in the
commercial speech context. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
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noncommercial speech. 124 On the contrary, a variety of underlying conceptual difficulties require consideration. It was this
unsettling amalgamation of tensions and conflicts which the
California Supreme Court faced upon remand from the U.S.
Supreme Court in Metromedia III.

III

Metromedia III
The Metromedia II plurality opinion made clear the task of
the California Supreme Court on remand: "Since our judgment is based essentially on the inclusion of noncommercial
speech within the prohibitions of the ordinance, the California
courts may sustain the ordinance by limiting its reach to commercial speech, assuming the ordinance is susceptible to this
treatment."'2 5 Accordingly, the California court attempted to
provide a limiting construction to the ordinance, or, alternatively, to sever its objectionable portions in order that it conform to the plurality's guidelines. 2 6
The California court first considered whether it could construe "outdoor advertising displays" to mean "commercial
signs" only.'2 7 The court noted the major limitation on construing statutes, pointing out that a court may not "rewrite the statute" by adding constitutionally-required "qualifying
124. Applying the equal or greater protection rule becomes problematic even where
the Court provides explicit instructions, as those in Metromedia H to remove the reach
of the restriction from noncommercial speech. The Metromedia III decision demonstrates that implementing this rule represents no small chore. See infra, discussion of
Metromedia III, notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
125. Metromedia1H, 453 U.S. at 522 n.26. Predictably, disagreement arose even as to
what the U.S. Supreme Court had authorized the California court to do. Metromedia
argued that the plurality's earlier statement in reference to the ordinance "which we
invalidate today" indicated that the ordinance was beyond salvaging. Metromedia III,
32 Cal. 3d at 184 n.5 (quoting Metromedia II, 453 U.S. at 521 n.25). The California
Supreme Court resolved this dispute in favor of the plurality's "unequivocal statement" directing a determination of whether the ordinance could be saved. Id.
126. Metromedia III, 32 Cal. 3d at 180.
127. Id. at 186. The court noted:
Judicial doctrine governing construction of a law to avoid unconstitutionality
is well settled. If "the terms of a statute are by fair and reasonable interpretation capable of a meaning consistent with the requirements of the Constitu-'
tion, the statute will be given that meaning, rather than another in conflict
with the Constitution."
Id. (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Legg, 5 Cal. 2d 349, 353 (1936); People v. Davis, 68
Cal. 2d 481, 483-84 (1968); San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937,
948 (1971)).
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provisions.' 1 28 The effect of such a practice would be to usurp

the legislative function. 1 29 The court concluded that the construction proposed was unacceptable on the ground that its
adoption would run counter to the San Diego City Council's
original legislative intent, which the court interpreted as
follows:
It does not appear ... that the city intended to limit its ban to
billboards which carried commercial messages. To the contrary, the city's concern was not with the message but with the
structure. The purpose of the ordinance was to eliminate signs
which distracted pedestrians and motorists and which blighted
the aesthetic character of the city; the commercial or noncommercial character of the billboard's message is largely irrelevant to these goals. 3 °
The court found this interpretation the most reasonable despite its statement in the same paragraph that "the city's intent, as we noted in our previous opinion, was 'the prohibition
of commercial billboards' or, more accurately stated, the prohibition of 'permanent structures used predominantly for commercial advertising.' "131
Though these statements of the
intent are not completely consistent, the court's interpretation
is not unreasonable in view of the emphasis it was willing to
place on the structural characteristics of the target of the ordinance over the possible character of the messages the ban
13 2
reached.
On the other hand, the city of San Diego made its intent
clear in response to the Metromedia II decision by adding a
severance clause to the ordinance, which authorized deletion
33
of constitutionally objectionable portions of the ordinance.
The Metromedia III dissenters pointed out that the severance
clause made the city's intent plain, concluding that "the city
prefers to preserve its old ordinance even in truncated form,
rather than rely solely on its newly enacted time, place and
manner regulations."'"
In addition to rejecting a new construction of the ordinance,
the California court refused to sever its unconstitutional por128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 187 (quoting Blair v. Pitchness, 5 Cal. 3d 258 (1971)).

(quoting Metromedia I, 16 Cal. 3d at 856 n.2).
at 188.
at 194 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
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tions. The court first observed that a severed version of the
ordinance would "take a strange form"'135 as its provisions for
the time alloted to remove billboards and its exceptions would
be difficult to apply and/or irrelevant to a law confined to commercial speech alone. 3 6 The court went on to identify the major problem with severing the ordinance as one of interpreting
the ordinance's original purpose. The court then found that a
severed ordinance would not serve the original law's purpose,
citing two principal grounds.
First, because the elimination of billboards was perceived as
the purpose of the ordinance, the severed version would serve
that purpose only to the extent that parties wishing to convey
noncommercial messages would be unlikely to choose the billboard as an appropriate medium. 13 In this regard, the court
felt that a severed ordinance "would offer no assurance that a
substantial number of billboards . . . would be removed, or
that the erection of new billboards would be inhibited."' 3 8 This
rationale seems dubious in view of the court's own statement
in Metromedia I that the court's effort to limit the reach of the
ban to begin with to commercial messages 3 9 would give substantial effect to the city's purpose."4 As the dissent argued,
the city may well have seen a ban on commercial billboards as
a means of giving effect to its original purpose. Billboard leasing may not be economically feasible if made to depend on
4
noncommercial advertising alone.1 '
The second ground for rejecting the option of severance appears more supportable, and reflects what seems to be the
heart of the decision. The court observed, "Such [a severed]
ordinance, moreover, would require the city to police the content of advertising messages, and would compel it to distinguish commercial from noncommercial speech-an extremely
difficult task, and one which presents serious constitutional
problems."' 4 2 The court cited Justice Brennan's concurrence
135. Id. at 190.
136. Id. The applicability of the exceptions, it should be noted, was problematic to
begin with. See supra note 90.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See supra note 19.
140. See Metromedia I, 26 Cal. 3d at 857 n.2.
141. Metromedia Ill, 32 Cal. 3d at 195 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 190 (citing 453 U.S. at 536-40 (Brennan, J., concurring)). This language
appears elsewhere in the decision. E.g., Metromedia Ill, 32 Cal. 3d at 183, 191.

No. 31

COMMERCIAL SPEECH REGULATION

for this proposition. 4 3
The reliance on Justice Brennan's main objection to the Metromedia II plurality by the California court, together with the
court's judgment that the city's intent was not to distinguish
between commercial and noncommercial speech, demonstrates the court's clear reluctance to implement the guidelines
set forth in the Metromedia II plurality opinion. This reluctance is even more significant in light of the fact that those
guidelines would have provided substantially the same result
as that arising from the California court's own Metromedia I
decision-the validation of a law which would eliminate most
of San Diego's billboards.
In effect, Metromedia III aligns the California court with the
position of the Metromedia 11 concurrence and rejects the plurality's opinion. This is further indicated in the California
court's language regarding content-based restrictions: "[T] he
legislative purpose may be better served by an ordinance
which bans most off-site billboards than by one which draws a
1
distinction based on the content of the billboard's message."'"
This statement reflects a view of content neutrality virtually
identical to that of the Metromedia II concurrence.14 5 It suggests that a governmental unit may not distinguish commercial
from noncommercial speech. To do so would be to engage in
constitutionally impermissible content discrimination, at least
in the absence of some clear-cut basis for drawing the distinction other than the government's determination of its own interests or values.
The main difficulty with the Metromedia III decision is that
its rejection of the plurality's guidelines rests on the somewhat
amorphous language of the limiting construction doctrine and
the unexplained and unsupported view that distinguishing
commercial from noncommercial speech raises constitutional
difficulties. The result is a lack of clear judicial guidance;"
guidance which is necessary for legislative bodies to do their
job. On the other hand, the California court's philosophical position regarding the breadth of content neutrality and resulting
143. Id.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
146. In that regard, the Metromedia III admonition to the city of San Diego to limit
its regulations to time, place and manner restrictions (L.A. 30782 at 18) represents an
anomaly of considerable proportions; in the judgment of the Metromedia I court, that's
what the city did to begin with. See Metromedia I, 26 Cal. 3d 848 (1980).
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degree of protection of commercial speech is made fairly clear
from its reliance on the Metromedia 11 concurrence; the California court favors broader first amendment protection than
that extended by the U.S. Supreme Court in Metromedia II.
In light of this difference, Metromedia III implies one practical effect on future legislation; the decision may effectively preclude the use of the Metromedia 11 guidelines in drafting
future California ordinances, as the California Supreme Court
will be wary of legislative restrictions which discriminate
among different categories of speech. Further, the court will
probably not rely on the hierarchy of values reasoning in analyzing content-based regulations of speech. And at this stage,
at least, it seems unlikely that the court will uphold restrictions on billboards which do not qualify, in its judgment, as
1 47
time, place and manner regulations.
In one sense, the California court's position favoring broader
protection of expression than allowed by the Metromedia II
plurality's guidelines appears consistent with the general standards set by the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years. This
would seem to be the case at least insofar as the trend of the
pre-CentralHudson commercial speech cases and the broad
neutrality rule of Mosley suggest such standards. Despite the
difficulty of applying the Mosley neutrality rule, 14 the scope of
content neutrality is expanding beyond traditional viewpoint
neutrality, as even Metromedia II demonstrates. 4 9
In another sense, however, the California court's position
may be seen as moving beyond that of the U.S. Supreme Court.
To the extent that Metromedia II can be unscrambled, its opinions suggest that only two Justices, Brennan and Blackmun,
favor a liberal neutrality rule, at least in the context of commercial speech. 5 ° Further, if the hierarchy of values reasoning
of Central Hudson as extended by the Metromedia II plurality' 5 1 holds sway in commercial speech cases, distinguishing
between commercial and noncommercial speech in the manner contemplated by the plurality would appear to be constitutionally permissible. In adopting the position of the
147. See Metromedia III, 32 Cal. 3d at 191.
148. See, e.g., Stephan supra note 16, at 206. See also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 107-09 & 114-15 and accompanying text.
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Metromedia 11 concurrence then, the California court has arguably departed from federal standards regarding commercial
speech and content regulation.
As those standards remain unsettled, however, the California court has succeeded in leaving itself options-and in this
respect its lack of a clearly articulated position makes sense.
When federal standards become settled, no genuine obstacle
has been created by Metromedia III to adopting them; the California court has simply not made explicit its opposition to the
Metromedia II decision. It has, however, implied a preference
regarding those standards, and may comfortably extend
greater protection of commercial speech and broader neutrality principles on the basis of Metromedia III rather than adopting federal standards. That is, the California court may decide,
as it has in the obscenity context, 152 to expand protection of
expression on independent state grounds. Should a regulation
of expression based on the Metromedia II guidelines come
before the state court, it may well decide to invalidate the regulation on that basis.
IV

Conclusion
Problems concerning the proper objects and scope of both
governmental regulation and of first amendment protection are
enduring, to say the least. The pattern of Supreme Court decisions involving such problems makes for a virtual roadmap of
first amendment adjudication. In such a weighty context the
conflict between billboard lessors and the San Diego City
Council, an unremarkable controversy at first blush, has assumed unusual proportions. Although the Metromedia v. San
Diego litigation appears awash in confusion, the cases have
nevertheless served to highlight constitutional difficulties of
significance beyond the bounds of billboard control.
This note has attempted to illuminate certain issues which
underlie conflicts between first amendment protection and
governmental regulation. The interrelated issues of content
neutrality, the theoretical basis for distinguishing between
152. See New York v. Ferber,-U.S.-, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3354 n.7 (1982). Four states,
including California, adhere to the stricter standard of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966), while the Supreme Court has adopted a relaxed standard in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller has been adopted by 37 states.
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commercial and noncommercial speech and for differentiating
their respective degrees of protection, remain unresolved. It is
not suggested here that their resolution will be easy, but rather
that the Supreme Court might be better equipped to address
them once its attention is turned to the fact that such fundamental issues remain unsettled and that its uneven application
of Mosley and Virginia Pharmacy have compounded the con-

stitutional difficulties. It is that message which the opinion in
Metromedia III apparently sought to convey.

